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Waiver of the Right to Remove in
Forum Selection Clauses Subject
to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards
by William E. Marple*
and Andrew 0. Wirmani"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Three federal appellate decisions have now addressed whether, in
cases subject to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),'
parties may agree to waive their right to remove to federal court through
forum selection clauses.2 In all three cases, each court held that to be
enforceable the waiver must be expressed in "clear and unequivocal"

* Of Counsel, Jones Day, Dallas, Texas. Indiana University (A.B., 1970); Indiana
University Maurer School of Law (J.D., 1973). Member, State Bars of Indiana (inactive)
and Texas.
** Associate, Jones Day, Dallas, Texas. University of Texas (A.B., 2002); University
of Texas School of Law (J.D., 2006). Member, State Bar of Texas.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the Authors.
1. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [herinafter New York Convention]. For a discussion
of the provisions of the New York Convention and its applicability in the United States
through the Convention Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006), see Susan L. Karamanian, The

Road to the Tribunaland Beyond: InternationalCommercialArbitrationand United States
Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 17 (2002).

2. Ensco Int'l, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 579 F.3d 442, 443 (5th Cir.
2009); Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2000); McDermott Int'l,
Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1200 (5th Cir. 1991).
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terms or meet some other heightened standard of scrutiny.3 These court
decisions present several significant points. First, the decisions of these
courts to deviate from general principles of contract construction and
analyze the waiver issue under heightened scrutiny is out of step with
the principles established by the Supreme Court of the United States for
construing forum selection clauses in international contracts and
arbitration provisions generally.' Second, these decisions conflict with
the well-recognized ability of foreign commercial entities to draft such
clauses with clarity to avoid waiver of the right to remove.' Third, the
court decisions are at odds with the international business community's
preference for liberal enforcement of forum selection clauses, as the
provisions of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
(Hague Convention)6 points out.7 Finally, the decisions impose a
preference for federal court adjudication on parties' privately negotiated
agreements that is absent from the text of the New York Convention.'
However, contrary to the prevailing judicial view, the intent of parties
to waive their right to remove in cases subject to the New York
Convention should be determined-as it would be in any other case-by
applying ordinary principles of contract construction.
II.

THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND THE CONVENTION ACT

Through amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),'
Congress implemented the New York Convention."o The New York
Convention requires enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards made in foreign countries." Commonly called the Convention
Act," the amendments apply to "commercial" arbitration agreements

3. Ensco, 579 F.3d at 448 ("[W]hether the Policies meet the McDermott waiver
standard is properly answered under the 'clear and unequivocal' test. . . ."); id. at 449 ("[A
waiver of the right to remove under § 205 must be 'express' or 'explicit.'") (Owen, J.,
concurring in judgment only) (quoting McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1209); Suter, 223 F.3d at
158 (holding that "there can be no waiver of a right to remove under the Convention Act
in the absence of clear and unambiguous language requiring such a waiver"); McDermott,
944 F.2d at 1209 ("we will give effect only to explicit waivers of Convention Act removal
rights," and "we adopt the express waiver rule. . . .").
4. See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Suter, 223 F.3d at 164-65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6. June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
7.

See generally id.

8. Suter, 223 F.3d at 157-58 (quoting In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d 1230,
1243 (3d Cir. 1994)); see New York Convention, supra note 1.
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
10. Karamanian, supra note 1, at 18.
11. Id. at 33 & nn. 102, 106.
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006).
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between citizens of differing nations.13 "[Tihe Convention Act 'demonstrates the firm commitment of the Congress to the elimination of
vestiges of judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, at least
in the international context."'
By granting state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases
implicating the New York Convention, the Convention Act specifically
contemplates that these cases might be filed in state court." Thus,
state courts may hear cases subject to the New York Convention, but
these cases may be removed to federal court under expanded removal
provisions. 16 Under the New York Convention, "[tihe procedure for
removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except that the
ground for removal . .. need not appear on the face of the complaint but
may be shown in the petition for removal."" Furthermore, a Convention Act case may be removed "at any time before .

.

. trial,"" and the

district courts have jurisdiction "regardless of the amount in controversy."o Aside from these three provisions, Congress did not indicate that
any special rules apply to removal or to forum selection clauses in
Convention Act cases; thus, the Act does not include any heightened
standard to effectuate a waiver of the right to remove.20
III. Do YOU TRUST YouR LOCAL COURT?
In the most recent federal appellate decision addressing a waiver of
the right to remove in a case subject to the Convention Act, Ensco
International, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,21 two members

13.

9 U.S.C. § 202 ("An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal

relationship .

.

. which is considered as commercial . . . falls under the Convention."); see

also Karamanian, supra note 1, at 34-36 (discussing § 202 of the Convention Act).
14. Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat, 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974)); see also
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14 (1985)
(noting that the FAA "was designed to overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to
agreements to arbitrate").
15. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1208 n.12
(5th Cir. 1999); see also 9 U.S.C. § 203 ("An action or proceeding falling under the
Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.");
9 U.S.C. § 205 (providing for removal "of an action or proceeding pending in a State court
[that] relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention").
16. 9 U.S.C. § 205; see also McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1208 n.12.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 205.
18. Id. The general removal statute requires removal within thirty days of service of
the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).

19. 9 U.S.C. § 203.
20. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
21.

579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).

504

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

of a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed that a forum selection clause in an insurance policy between a
United States company and its foreign insurer waived the right of the
insurer to remove to federal court." The clause in question stated,
"Any disputes arising under or in connection with [this insurance policy]
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Dallas
County, Texas."2 3 In two earlier federal appellate decisions addressing
the waiver issue, Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co.24 and McDermott
International, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London,2 5 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits held that the
"service of suit" clause did not waive the right to remove to federal court
because of ambiguity.2 6 In McDermott the service of suit clause stated,
[Insurers] hereon, at the request of the [insured] will submit to the
jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United
States and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such
Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of such court.27
The difference between the two clauses is that the clause in Ensco
provided for exclusive jurisdiction in Dallas County, Texas," whereas
the clauses in Suter and McDermott merely provided that the insurer
would submit to jurisdiction in a forum in the United States without
expressly providing for exclusive jurisdiction in that court or otherwise
limiting the right to remove." If the insured under the latter clause
chose to file in state court, the only way to give effect to the clause
would be to deem it a waiver of the right to remove. Indeed, if an
insurer chose to bring suit in state court, an insured could not both file

22. Id. at 443, 449.
23. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). Judge Jolly dissented and argued that this clause was
insufficient to waive removal despite the parties' agreement to "exclusive jurisdiction" in
a Texas state court because it did not expressly state that the insurer waived its right to
remove. Id. at 451 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
24. 223 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2000).
25. 944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1991).
26. Suter, 223 F.3d at 159-60; see McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1209-13.
27. 944 F.2d at 1200. The clause in Suter was substantively identical. See 223 F.3d
at 153.
28. 579 F.3d at 443. The Fifth Circuit has held that designating the courts "of" a state
refers only to state courts, not federal courts. Dixon v. TSE Int'l, Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398
(5th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a forum selection clause designating the "Courts of Texas"
waives the right to remove to federal court because federal courts are not courts of Texas).
29. See 223 F.3d at 153; 944 F.2d at 1200.
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a petition for removal and fulfill its agreement to "comply with all
requirements necessary to give [the state] Court jurisdiction."o
Consistent with this logic, both the Third and Fifth Circuits had
previously held in non-Convention Act cases that a service-of-suit clause
virtually identical to the ones in Suter and McDermott effected a waiver
of the insurer's right to remove." In fact, until the decisions in Suter
and McDermott, it appears that courts had uniformly construed serviceof-suit clauses as including a waiver of the right to remove to federal
court.32 The core legal issue then is whether there is something unique
about the Convention Act that warrants divergence from established
precedent and basic principles of contract construction. Two circuits in
three separate decisions have now concluded that there is, holding that
parties entering agreements governed by the Convention Act cannot
waive their right to remove unless they employ clear and unequivocal
language."
In McDermott the Fifth Circuit held that while a party can waive its
right to remove under the Convention Act, that waiver must be
"express," "explicit," or "clear and unequivocal."3 4 The basic underpinning of the McDermott decision was the Fifth Circuit's finding that two
different clauses in the insurance policies at issue governed forum
selection.s In addition to the service-of-suit clause set forth above, the
insurance policies contained an arbitration clause that the Fifth Circuit
in McDermott held to be "a co-equal forum selection clause."
The
arbitration clause provided that "[aill differences arising out of this
contract shall be referred to the decision of any arbitrator to be

30. McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1200; see Suter, 223 F.3d at 153.
31. See Suter, 223 F.3d at 154 (citing Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207,
1216-17 (3d Cir. 1991)); McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1204-05 ("When a policy's service-of-suit
clause applies, its probable effect is to waive the insurer's removal rights."). The Third
Circuit in Fosterspecifically rejected the argument that waiver of the right to remove must
be "clear and unequivocal," and instead held that the court should use the same rules of
construction as it would in interpreting other contractual provisions. 933 F.2d at 1218
n.15.
32. See, e.g., Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1047 (11th Cir.
2001); Foster,933 F.2d at 1216-17 (citations omitted); City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Ins. Co.,
931 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1991); Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 955 F. Supp. 1066, 1071-72 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, 115 P.3d 68, 72 & n.3 (Cal. 2005).
33. Ensco, 579 F.3d at 448; Suter, 223 F.3d at 158; McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1209, 1212.
34. McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1209, 1212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Fifth Circuit in McDermott "used the terms 'explicit,' 'express,' 'unambiguous,' and 'clear
and unequivocal' almost interchangeably." Ensco, 579 F.3d at 444.
35. See McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1204-06.
36. Id. at 1205.
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appointed by the parties." Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that if
the arbitration clause governed, waiver of the right to remove would not
be implicated." The Fifth Circuit in McDermott also relied on a second
circumstance in concluding that the two clauses created an ambiguity:
the parties stipulated that before litigation "neither expressed an opinion
as to the effect of the service-of-suit clause on removability or the
relationship between the service-of-suit and arbitration clauses.""
Whether the agreement in McDermott was truly ambiguous is
questionable because parties can waive their right to arbitrate. Thus,
the service-of-suit clause can be seen as an alternative forum selection
clause applicable in the event that neither party invoked the right to
arbitrate. Nonetheless, if the Fifth Circuit in McDermott had grounded
its waiver analysis solely in the agreement's purported ambiguity, the
decision would have been of little lasting importance with respect to
Convention Act cases generally. But the Fifth Circuit went on to
articulate a general heightened standard for reviewing waiver of the
right to remove under the Convention Act, which was grounded in the
notion-absent from the Convention Act itself-that state courts should
not decide issues of arbitrability in international disputes.o
First, the Fifth Circuit noted that not all of the states recognized the
validity of arbitration agreements when the United States implemented
the New York Convention in 1970." Thus, the Fifth Circuit feared
that some states might "revert to the common law view of [disfavoring]

arbitration" and refuse to enforce arbitration clauses subject to the
Convention Act." Second, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the increased

37. Id. at 1200. If the parties disagreed as to the selection of a single arbitrator, they
each could select one, and if those two disagreed as to the result, the parties could ask "a
court of competent jurisdiction within the limits of the United States of America" to appoint
an "umpire." Id. at 1200-01. But the insured (McDermott) had the right to choose the
place of arbitration. Id. at 1201.
38. See id. at 1205.
39. Id. at 1204, 1206.
40. See id. at 1209-11.
41. Id. at 1210. Only thirty-six states enforced arbitration agreements in 1968. Id.;
see also U.S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS,

S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, at 7 (2d Sess. 1968); Karamanian, supra note 1, at 30 n.76 ("In 1958,
the laws of a 'vast majority of the states' rendered arbitration agreements 'revocable and
unenforceable.'").
42. McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1210. The Supreme Court had earlier held that the FAA,
which recognizes and liberally enforces arbitration clauses, is binding on state courts. See
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984). As the Supreme Court stated in
Keating, by enacting § 2 of the FAA, Congress declared that written arbitration agreements
are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" as a national policy equally applicable in state as
well as federal courts. Id. at 10. Since its 1984 decision in Keating, the Supreme Court
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state court litigation that would result from a less stringent standard
might lead to "anomalous" decisions, potentially causing courts in other
countries to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements negotiated by U.S.
companies.4 3 Relying on these policy grounds, the Fifth Circuit adopted
a bright-line "express waiver rule" to make it easier for the federal
district courts to decide the issue and expedite the path to arbitration."
A decade later in Suter, the Third Circuit reached the same result as
McDermott for many of the same reasons." The majority in Suter
looked to an earlier Third Circuit case decided under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),4 6 In re Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp.,47 which expressed a strong preference for a federal forum in
cases subject to the FSIA.4 ' The FSIA strips foreign states of sovereign
"immunity from suit in the United States."" Therefore, in FSIA cases,
"policy considerations touching on the international relations of the
has reiterated this holding. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272
(1995) (holding "that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state law ... and ... that state
courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements"); Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (stating
that "due regard must be given [by state courts] to the federal policy favoring arbitration").
In light of the applicability of the FAA in state courts, one study has suggested that state
courts are likely to enforce arbitration agreements. See John M. Townsend, State Court
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM 26

(Oct. 2006), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilr docs/29/issue/ADR/STU.
html ("Twenty-two years after the Supreme Court held that the FAA applies in and must
be enforced by state courts, parties who have agreed to . . . arbitration can generally
depend on those agreements being enforced in state court. Overt judicial hostility to
arbitration now represents the exception rather than the rule, and it is rare for an
agreement .. . to be refused enforcement.").
43. McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1211.
44. Id. As previously noted, the Fifth Circuit varied the language that it used for its
rule, including "express waiver," "explicit waiver," and "clear and unequivocal" waiver.
See id. at 1209, 1211-13. The Fifth Circuit rejected the insurer's "argulment] that Congress
. . . confer[red] on international litigants a nonwaivable right to a federal forum" in the
Convention Act. Id. at 1208. The Fifth Circuit explained that Congress did not provide
for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in the Convention Act, and there is a "presumption
of concurrent jurisdiction" with state courts unless there is an "unmistakable implication
from legislative history [I or . .. a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and
federal interests." Id. at 1208 n.12 (quoting Gulf Off-shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 478 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See 223 F.3d at 159-60.
46. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
47. 15 F.3d 1230 (3d Cir. 1994).
48. Suter, 223 F.3d at 157-58 (quoting In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d at

1239, 1241, 1243).
49. Id. at 164 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d at
1243).
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United States," possible interference with international relations by
"local bias" against foreign states, and the potential lack of uniformity
of law by local state courts, justifies a preference for federal court.o
The majority in Suter found the same policy considerations implicated
by the Convention Act and thus concluded that waiver of the right to
remove in such Convention Act cases must be "clear and unambiguous."5 ' Notably, while the Third Circuit concluded that "the Convention Act and the policy choices that support it establish a strong and
clear preference for a federal forum,"" this preference is absent from
the language of the Convention Act itself."
Judge (now Justice) Alito dissented in Suter and would have applied
the normal rules of contract interpretation, not the heightened "clear
and unequivocal" standard." Judge Alito concluded that the foreign
policy concerns of the FSIA were much greater than those of the
Convention Act, primarily because the FSIA strips foreign sovereigns of
immunity, whereas the Convention Act "does not regulate the interaction
of states."" Judge Alito further noted that the right to remove under
the FSIA is "unqualified."" Therefore, according to Judge Alito, "[tihe
FSIA exception to general rules of removal cannot be extended by
analogy to include removal under the Convention Act."" But more
fundamentally, Judge Alito concluded that requiring a heightened
standard to find waiver of removal rights in Convention Act cases is
unfair." Judge Alito explained as follows:
[The insurer] is a massive corporation with excellent counsel who
engaged in careful negotiations with another corporation. As part of
its deal, it willingly offered to litigate in any forum selected by its
partner. Such a promise seems on its face to be a promise not to
remove a case, and our cases make clear that it will be interpreted as

50. Id. at 157 (majority opinion).
51.

Id. at 158. As the Third Circuit concluded in In re Texas Eastern Transmission

Corp., "the FSIA implie[s] a congressional intent that courts depart from their normal
practice and construe forum selection clauses in favor of a sovereign's right to remove
pursuant to the Act." Id. at 162 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing In re Tex. E. Transmission
Corp., 15 F.3d at 1239).
52. Id. at 158 (majority opinion).
53. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006).
54. See Suter, 223 F.3d at 162-65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 163-64. The Convention Act applies only to private commercial entities, see
9 U.S.C. § 202, most of which are sophisticated and fully capable of ascertaining the
ramifications of a service-of-suit clause.
56. Suter, 223 F.3d at 164-65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 164.
58. Id. at 165.
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such-except in cases involving removal under the FSIA. Today the
majority allows this corporation to walk away from its freely entered
obligation."
According to Judge Alito, because the insurer willingly agreed to litigate
in any forum selected by the insured, the Third Circuit "should not
depart . . . from the generally applicable rule."6 o
In contrast to Judge Alito, in Ensco Judges Owen and Jolly insisted
that the Fifth Circuit apply the McDermott standard, requiring an
"express" or "explicit" waiver instead of relying on cases applying general
contract principles." However, Judge Owen concluded that the use of
the word "exclusive" in referring to the designated forum as "the Courts
of Dallas County, Texas [was] explicit or express land] . . . wellunderstood . . . [as] mean[ing] solely in Dallas County courts or to the

exclusion of other courts that may have jurisdiction.'12 Therefore,
Judge Owen would not require the use of "magic words" such as "waiver"
or "removal" to accomplish waiver in cases subject to the Convention
Act." But in dissent, Judge Jolly concluded that although one could
infer from the "exclusive jurisdiction" language in the service-of-suit
clause that the insurers waived their right to remove and that under a
normal contract analysis the Fifth Circuit would recognize this waiver,
4
"under the express waiver rule, an inferred waiver is not sufficient."'6
in
Judge Jolly apparently found the policy considerations articulated
McDermott so strong as to require parties to explicitly state that they
were agreeing to waive their right to remove before a court could give
effect to that intent.6 s Therefore, even though the sophisticated
corporate defendant in Ensco agreed, undoubtedly only after conferring
with counsel, to "exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Dallas County,
Texas," Judge Jolly concluded that there was no waiver of the right to
remove.66
The dissents in Ensco and Suter represent opposite ends of judicial
thinking on the waiver issue. Judge Alito would apply the same
standard of waiver applicable to forum selection clauses generally,
whereas Judge Jolly would require the use of "magic words" expressly

59. Id.
60. Id. at 164-65.
61. Ensco, 579 F.3d at 449 (Owen, J., concurring in the judgment only); id. at 450
(Jolly, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 450 (Owen, J., concurring in the judgment only).
63. Id. at 444 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 451 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
65. See id.
66. Id. at 450-51.
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mentioning waiver and removal. The majority in each of the three cases
does not require specific references to waiver or removal. Nevertheless,
in each case the majority requires something more than mere language
that would demonstrate a party's intent to waive removal under normal
rules of contract construction.
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FAVORS FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSES

The three federal appellate decisions failed to discuss in depth the
Supreme Court's line of cases upholding-indeed favoring-forum
selection clauses in a variety of contexts during the past four decades.
According to the Supreme Court, not only should forum selection clauses
be construed under general principles of contract construction, but such
clauses are favored and are therefore presumptively valid."
For
example, in Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co.," the Supreme Court
disavowed any bias against forum selection clauses, holding instead
"that such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under
the circumstances."
The Supreme Court held that this rule is a
logical extension of the proposition it previously recognized for federal
courts: a party may consent to adjudication in a jurisdiction where the
party cannot be reached for service of process." Even though the
forum selected by the parties in Bremen was in a foreign country, the
Supreme Court enforced the forum selection clause against an American
company, stating that "agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to
both parties is an indispensable element in international trade,
commerce, and contracting."" According to the Supreme Court, the
forum selection clause would be enforced unless the objecting party
"could clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust,
or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching."72 Thus, the Supreme Court gave effect to ordinary and "ancient
concepts of freedom of contract.""
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,7 a case
decided under the Convention Act, the Supreme Court once again

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 15.

73.
74.

Id. at 11.
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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recognized "a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely
negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions."" Unless Congress
has indicated otherwise, parties should be required to uphold their
arbitration agreements." Since the implementation of the New York
Convention in 1970, this federal policy favoring arbitration has
"applie[d] with special force in the field of international commerce."n
The Supreme Court demonstrated a firm belief in the efficacy of
arbitration to resolve international commercial disputes and an equally
strong commitment to enforcing freely negotiated forum selection
clauses.78 Absent a showing that the agreement was "'[alffected by
fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power'; that
'enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust'; or that proceedings 'in
the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that
[the resisting party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day
in court,"' a forum selection agreement should be enforced. 9
It is difficult to reconcile McDermott International, Inc. v. Lloyds
Underwriters of London,'o Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co.," and
Ensco International,Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's" with the
Supreme Court's numerous decisions giving effect to forum selection
clauses. While the Third and Fifth Circuits relied on a general notion
that agreements implicating foreign relations are best construed by
federal courts, the Supreme Court's precedents indicate that forum
selection is first and foremost a matter of private agreement. Neither
Circuit clearly explained why a general fear that state courts will not
enforce arbitration agreements, absent from the text of the Convention
Act, should trump what the parties unambiguously agreed to. Indeed,
forum selection clauses requiring American citizens to litigate in faraway tribunals also implicate international relations, yet the Supreme
Court has consistently held that such clauses are enforceable under
general principles of contract construction. Thus, the Supreme Court's
willingness to enforce forum selection clauses against American
companies, far from supporting heightened scrutiny of forum selection

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 632 (alterations in original) (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 15, 18).
944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1991).
223 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2000).
579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
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clauses under the Convention Act, appears to mandate that courts
simply enforce those clauses as written."
This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's arbitration
jurisprudence, in which it has consistently held that "arbitration is a
matter of contract,"" and consequently, "as with any other contract, the
parties' intentions control." According to the Supreme Court, the FAA
"simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms."' And
because "arbitration is strictly a matter of contract, the parties to an
arbitration agreement should be at liberty to choose the terms under
which they will arbitrate."" Applying these rules, the Supreme Court
has already held that under ordinary contract principles, notwithstanding the force of the FAA, parties are free to agree that state rather than
federal law will govern their agreements to arbitrate, regardless of
whether that agreement implicates interstate commerce." Given this
precedent, it is difficult to see why the mere implication of the Convention Act should render as null a party's clear intent to waive its right to
remove, effectively mandating a federal forum in contravention of the
parties' agreement to proceed in state court.
V.

FOREIGN COMPANIES ARE NOT LEGALLY NAIvE

The majorities in McDermott International,Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters
of London," Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co.," and Ensco International, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's" also failed to give due
weight to the fact that sophisticated foreign commercial entities, such as
Lloyds, are perfectly capable of protecting their right to remove to
federal court if they desire to do so. For example, in Boghos v. Certain

83. For a discussion of the various approaches that the federal courts of appeals have
taken in determining whether parties have contractually waived the right of removal, see
David S. Coale, Rebecca L. Visosky & Diana K. Cochrane, ContractualWaiver of the Right
to Remove to FederalCourt: How Policy Judgments Guide ContractInterpretation,29 REV.

LITIG. 327 (2009-2010).
84. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
85.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626.

86. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
87. Id. at 472 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88.

Id. at 472-73, 479.

89. 944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1991).
90. 223 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2000).
91.

579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
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Underwriters at Lloyd's of London," the forum selection clause in a
1999 Lloyd's policy provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Underwriters have agreed that, at the request of Assured (or Reinsured) they will submit to the jurisdiction of a court of competent
jurisdiction within the United States. Nothing in this clause constitutes or should be understood to constitute a waiver of Underwriters'
rights .

.

. to remove an action to a United States District Court."

The California Supreme Court noted that Lloyd's policies are sold
throughout the United States with the same service-of-suit clause. 94
Indeed, substantively identical language preserving the right to remove
was contained in a Lloyd's policy set forth in a 1994 published opinion.95 Thus, the ability of Lloyd's entities to preserve their right to
remove was well established before Suter or Ensco were decided.
Therefore, there is no basis for a court's interpreting a service-of-suit
clause to speculate that a foreign commercial entity, especially a large
international insurance company, is somehow unaware of how to
preserve its right to remove." Judge Alito's conclusion that it is unfair
when "a massive corporation with excellent counsel" agrees to venue in
a particular court and then tries to remove" is bolstered by the simple
expedient of expressly preserving the right to remove in a forum
selection clause as was done in the two cases cited above.
VI.

THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY ENDORSES FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

The rationales of the majorities in the three federal court of appeals
cases are also at odds with the current view of the international business
and geopolitical communities as set forth in the Hague Convention,
which was adopted in 2005 and approved,98 but not yet ratified, by the
United States.99 The Hague Convention provides that a forum selection
92. 115 P.3d 68 (Cal. 2005).
93. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 73.

95. See Saxon v. Lloyd's of London, 646 So. 2d 631, 636 (Ala. 1994).
96. A 1995 article set forth the following common-sense advice: "It is imperative that
forum selection clauses be drafted with specificity to avoid being found overly vague or
interpreted as merely 'permissive.' Technical specificity is also important where the parties
desire that a dispute be heard by a particular court in a particular state." Phillip A.
Buhler, Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses in InternationalContracts: A United
States Viewpoint with ParticularReference to Maritime Contractsand Bills of Lading, 27

U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 43 (1995).
97. Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2000).
98. Hague Convention, supra note 6, at 1294, 1303.
99. See Status Table, HCCH.NET, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). While the Hague Convention has been signed by
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clause "which designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or
more specific courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed to be
exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise." 00 The
Hague Convention recognizes the dual system of courts in the United
States and addresses removal by providing that the rules on exclusive
forum selection agreements "shall not affect rules- . . . on jurisdiction
related to subject matter or to the value of the claim" or "the internal
allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting State."'01
However, in such cases the court "should not lightly override" the
parties' choice of forum. 102 Therefore, in ordinary disputes between
international entities, the Hague Convention provides that parties
should be deemed to have agreed to exclusive venue in a state court in
the United States if they designate that court as a place where the case
may be brought.
Thus, although the Hague Convention does not apply to cases subject
to the New York Convention,0 3 it adopted a policy contrary to the rule
set forth by the Third and Fifth Circuits in favor of one in which forum
selection clauses are regarded as "exclusive unless the parties have
expressly provided otherwise."'
At a minimum, as do the decisions
in which a foreign insurer expressly preserved its right to remove, the
Hague Convention indicates that foreign commercial entities are-or
should be-aware that if they desire to preserve their right to remove,
they should expressly so provide."'

both the United States and the European Union, only Mexico has acceded to the Hague
Convention. Status Table, supra. The Hague Convention will take official effect after
"ratification, acceptance, approval[,l or accession" by either the United States or the
European Union. See Hague Convention, supra note 6, at 1302.
100. Hague Convention, supra note 6, at 1295 (emphasis added). The Hague
Convention requires that the court chosen by the parties take jurisdiction of the dispute
(art. 5), requires that courts not designated by the parties decline jurisdiction (art. 6), and
requires courts of nations adopting the Hague Convention to enforce a judgment from the
court designated by the parties (art. 8). Id. at 1296-97.
101. Id. at 1296.
102.

Trevor Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Convention of30 June 2005 on Choice of Court

Agreements, ExplanatoryReport, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 46

(June 30, 2005), http://www.hcch.net/uploadlexpl37e.pdf; Hague Convention, supra note 6,
at 1296.
103. Hague Convention, supra note 6, at 1295 ("This Convention shall not apply to
arbitration and related proceedings.").
104. Id.
105.

See id.
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CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE ON THE STANDARD FOR WAIVER OF
REMOVAL Is NOT INSIGNIFICANT

The courts of appeals in McDermott International, Inc. v. Lloyds
Underwriters of London,'o Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co.,o' and
Ensco International, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's08 simply
give short shrift to the ordinary rules by which statutes are construed.
Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute.'
While the ultimate goal of statutory construction is to determine the
statute's purpose, that endeavor must begin-and if the language of the
statute is unambiguous, end-with the words chosen by Congress."o
Indeed, "[ilt is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the
first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and
if that is plain,

..

.

the sole function of the courts is to enforce it

according to its terms." 1
The language of the Convention Act is plain: Congress did not include
language requiring heightened scrutiny of a party's decision to waive its
right to remove." 2 And this omission cannot be viewed as a mere
oversight. As the Third Circuit in Suter noted, Congress both expressly
recognized the removal issue and expanded the circumstances under
which parties may remove Convention Act cases to federal court."'
The Third Circuit in Suter also determined that the Convention Act
embodies Congress's "firm commitment. . . to the elimination of vestiges
of judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, at least in the
international context,"'.. one of the principle rationales given by courts
for analyzing the waiver issue under a heightened standard of review."1s However, despite contemplating the issue, Congress neither
granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of Convention Act cases nor
provided for heightened review of a party's decision to waive removal
rights."' The omission is significant because Congress knows how to
impose a heightened standard of review on parties' private agreements

106. 944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1991).
107. 223 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2000).
108. 579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
109. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
110. See id.
111. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
112. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006).
113. 223 F.3d at 158-59.
114. Id. at 155 (quoting McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat, 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d
Cir. 1974)).
115. See McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1209, 1211.
116. S. EXEc. REP. No. 10, at 7-8.

516

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

when it chooses to do so. The fact that Congress specifically chose not
to do so in the Convention Act demonstrates its intent that the waiver
issue be construed under the ordinary rules of contract construction
applicable to forum selection and arbitration provisions generally, not
under a heightened standard of review.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

When McDermott International, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of
London"' was decided nearly three decades ago, the legal landscape
regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements and the validity of
forum selection clauses was different than it is today. The Supreme
Court has held that the FAA is binding on state courts, and they are
now as equally obligated to enforce international arbitration agreements
as the federal courts."' It is also beyond cavil that foreign insurers,
such as Lloyd's, know how to protect their right to remove by expressly
preserving it. Moreover, the international business community has now
endorsed the use of forum selection clauses and has made the selected
forum exclusive. Finally, applying ordinary principles of contract
interpretation to Convention Act cases would simplify the courts'
analysis, give effect to the probable intent of the parties, and likely
result in quicker initiation of arbitration by reducing removals to federal
court that prolong the time before a court orders arbitration." For all
of these reasons, courts considering the waiver issue should step back
from McDermott, Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co.,120 and Ensco
International,Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd'sl 2' and consider
the broader body of analogous precedent and the attitude of the
international business community in deciding removal issues under the
Convention Act. A broader perspective might well result in applying

117.

944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1991).

118. Vaden v. Discover Bank,

_

U.S.

_,

,

129 S. Ct. 1262, 1271 (2009).

119. One commentator suggests that the stringent waiver standard avoids allowing
"cases to languish in the courts" prior to arbitration. Karamanian, supra note 1, at 91.
But ironically, McDermott "languished" in federal court for about twelve months (removed
03/01/1991, ordered to arbitration 02/18/1992), 944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1990); Suter v.
Munich Reinsurance Co. for about twenty months (removed 02/19/1999, ordered to
arbitration 10/12/2000), 223 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2000); and Ensco International, Inc. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's for about twenty-four months (removed 09/14/2007,
mandate issued by the Fifth Circuit 10/11/2009), 579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, the
stringent waiver standard provides a basis for a party seeking to delay arbitration to
remove the case and litigate the waiver issue for many months in federal court.
120. 223 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2000).
121. 579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
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ordinary contract principles, as suggested by Judge Alito, to give effect
to the probable intent of sophisticated commercial entities.

&

